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Abstract
This article presents the difficulties associated with the implementation of the 
regulatory goal of promoting investment and innovation within the area of sector 
specific regulation in telecoms. The encouragement of efficient investment is 
one of the major goals reflected in the EC and domestic legal rules on telecoms 
access as well as price- and rate of return regulation. The law and the interplay 
of the interests of incumbents and alternative operators create a fertile soil for 
the emergence of various regulatory concepts of stimulating investment and 
facility-based competition. Considered here are the concepts most frequently 
referred to in this context including: the notion of new and emerging markets, the 
ladder of investment theory, sunset clauses and dynamic pricing policies. However, 
most of these concepts had little influence on regulatory practice so far, seeing 
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as telecoms regulation is mostly directed at service competition and effective 
utilisation of existing infrastructures. This fact is the result of national regulators 
balancing their various regulatory goals in the existing technical and economic 
environment of the sector. The approach of the Polish regulatory authority towards 
these concepts constitutes an example of this reality. The urgent need to establish 
a new policy for next generation networks and access, bringing new technologies 
and business models to the sector, will have to induce more recognition for some 
concepts presented in this article. 
Classifications and key words: telecommunication, regulation, investment, regulatory 
holidays, ladder of investment, sunset clause, price regulation, telecommunications 
access.
I. Introduction
Investments are inseparably linked to economic risk. The high level of 
risk associated with the telecoms sector is associated with a capital-intensive 
profile of investment and the considerable size of necessary sunk costs. Large 
financial commitments are normally required to start an infrastructure-based 
telecoms business, and a significant part of that investment is impossible to 
recover in case of market exit. 
Market activities of major infrastructure operators are regulated. Regulation 
of wholesale and retail services provided by operators having significant 
market power (SMP) directly influences the ability to recover the costs of their 
investments. If regulatory control reduces the rate of return below the level 
achieved in un-regulated businesses then it weakens an operator’s readiness to 
invest. Regulation may induce or restrain investment incentives even though 
regulators normally assume that an operator’s drive to reduce costs, or to gain 
another competitive advantage, is a constant stimulus to invest. The expected 
level of return and the risk and uncertainty associated with these returns are 
generally recognised as the primary drivers of investment1. 
Regulatory effects are important to SMP operators using their own network to 
provide retail services as well as to alternative operators entering retail markets. 
SMP operators of fixed networks face the need of huge investments related to 
the construction of new generation networks (NGN) based on optical fibre. The 
main dilemma of alternative operators in the fixed sector, and virtual network 
operators in the mobile sector, is whether to engage in the construction of their 
1 An Assessment of the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications – Growth and 
Investment in the EU e-Communications Sector – report to the European Commission by London 
Economics in association with PricewaterhouseCoopers, July 2006, p. 72.
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own infrastructure or, alternatively, whether to use the incumbent’s network, 
access to which is made available to competitors by regulatory decisions. 
The telecoms sector in Poland requires significant investments, in particular, 
fixed networks providing broadband access necessary for the creation of the 
information society. Reports and studies published recently show the weakness 
of fixed broadband infrastructure in Poland and the low level of investments 
per capita in the telecoms sector2. 
The literature indicates various factors influencing the level of investment in 
telecoms. Many studies consider the regulatory environment to be a significant 
factor in this context3. The core regulatory effects result from sector specific 
regulation that co-exists with general legal rules applicable to businesses, 
particularly competition law. This article analyses the regulatory effects of 
ex ante regulation based on the EC electronic communications directives of 
2002, implemented into the Polish legal system by the Telecommunications 
Law of 2004. Provisions of these legal acts authorise extensive regulation of 
wholesale access to networks and services as well as the regulation of price 
and other conditions of retail services of SMP operators. Regulatory decisions 
issued by national regulatory bodies (NRA), represented in Poland by the 
decisions of the President of the Electronic Communications Office (UKE), 
directly affect investment decisions taken by the incumbent operator in the 
fixed sector and by major operators of mobile services. Regulation creates 
strong impulses influencing policies of alternative operators of fixed networks 
and new entrants into the mobile sector. 
II. The EC electronic communications directives on investment
The 2002 EC directives on electronic communications contain a series of 
provisions directly related to investment and innovation in the telecommunications 
sector. They are to be found mostly in the Framework Directive and in the 
Access Directive. Article 8 of the Framework Directive declares “encouraging 
efficient investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation” to be one of 
major regulatory objectives of the Directive. The ultimate effect of Article 8 
2 R. Cadman, Regulation and Investment in European Telecoms Markets – report for the 
European Competitive Telecoms Association, November 2007, p. 6. 
3 D. Flacher, H. Jennequin, J.-H. Lorenzi, “Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What 
are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future?” (2006) 64(4) Communications & Strategies 
105–123; P. Baakea, U. Kamecke, Ch. Wey, “Regulatory Framework for New and Emerging 
Markets” (2005) 60(4) Communications & Strategies 123–146; J. Gans, S. King, Access Holidays 
and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment, available at: www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/research.htm. 
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should be significant since NRAs are obliged to take all reasonable measures 
aimed at achieving the objectives specified in the directives. The goal of 
encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure is linked in Article 8(2) to the 
promotion of competition; that fact supports the differentiation of infrastructure 
competition, seen as a distinct regulatory outcome, from service competition. 
Article 8 is referred to in many other provisions of the directives which intensify 
the impact of the somehow broad language of this obligation. Limited influence 
on regulatory practice is attributed to a recital of the Framework Directive 
referring to “emerging markets, where de facto the market leader is likely to 
have a substantial market share but should not be subjected to inappropriate 
obligations”4. Market leadership resulting from investment and innovation 
should not be subject to premature regulation. 
The Access Directive seems to be more specific on the expected influence 
of regulatory decisions on investment in telecoms. Recital 19 if this Directive 
states that “the imposition by national regulatory authorities of mandated access 
that increases competition in the short-term should not reduce incentives for 
competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will secure more competition 
in the long-term”. This provision advises regulatory bodies not to reduce the 
motivation of alternative operators to invest in new infrastructure which should 
be beneficial for competition long term. The provisions of Article 12 of the 
Access Directive show strictly normative features determining the conditions 
of access to networks and services of SMP operators. The provisions of Article 
12(1) are of crucial importance for the determination of access conditions to 
services and network elements having significant influence on the development 
of competition. Access services, like among others, the access to the unbundled 
local loop (LLU), wholesale line rental (WLR), wholesale bitstream broadband 
services (BSA), co-location services and other forms of co-usage of ducts, 
building and masts showed to be critical for the development of competition. 
While determining the access obligations and assessing the proportionality of 
regulatory obligations, the Access Directive requires NRAs to take account of 
“the initial investment by the facility owner, bearing in mind the risks involved in 
making the investment”. Article 12 of this Directive grants alternative operators 
access to existing infrastructure, the non-replicable part of which is needed 
for the provision of their own services or for the construction of their own 
infrastructure. At the same time, the Access Directive promises SMP operators 
to take into account the initial risk associated with their investment. The price 
setting policy of the regulatory body should take into consideration the risk’s 
influence on the expected return on the capital employed. The EC rules on the 
creation of the conditions for long-term competition should induce regulatory 
4 Recital 27, Framework Directive.
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bodies to keep the right proportion of regulatory obligations stimulating service 
competition (based on the exploitation of existing infrastructure belonging to 
SMP operators) and obligations reinforcing infrastructure competition (based 
on the creation of alternative technical assets). 
The impact that regulatory decisions have on the investment inclination 
of SMP operators is associated not only with the obligations to grant access 
to specific services and network elements, but most of all with price setting 
policies pursued by regulators. The Access Directive permits various models 
of cost calculation and price control. However, according to Article 13(1) 
of this Directive “national regulatory authorities shall take into account the 
investment made by the operator and allow him a reasonable rate of return 
on adequate capital employed, taking into account the risks involved”. This 
provision is directly applicable to regulatory decisions setting wholesale prices 
of SMP operators within the process of dispute resolution and approval or 
determination of reference offers (eg. Reference Interconnection Offer – RIO, 
Reference Unbundling Offer – RUO). 
The above short review of the EC provisions on investment makes it possible 
to conclude that community law requires Member States and regulatory bodies 
to take account of the influence that regulation (in particular, the imposition 
on SMP operators of regulatory obligations) exerts on investment in telecoms. 
This should generally lead to the balancing of short term interests of alternative 
operators and end users, connected with an increase of service competition, 
and the long term objective of promoting infrastructure competition based 
on new facilities. 
III. Polish Telecommunications Law on investment
Regulatory decisions base on national legislation. The Polish Telecommuni-
cations Law of 2004 (hereinafter: PT) transposes into the national legal system 
all of the regulatory instruments contained in the EC directives on electronic 
communications. The provisions of the TL reflect also fairly accurately EC 
rules on investment. Article 1(2)(2) PT determines that the purpose of the 
Act is to create the conditions “for the development and usage of a modern 
telecommunications infrastructure”. This is one of its main goals aside of “the 
support of equal and effective competition within the scope of telecommu-
nications services provision”. Article 189(2) obliges the President of UKE to 
carry out regulatory policy aimed at “efficient investment in infrastructure and 
promoting innovative technologies”. The PT does not prioritise statutory goals 
and aims of regulatory policy leaving the task of their practical achievement 
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to the regulatory body. Where regulatory goals are concerned, investment is 
treated in accordance with the EC regulatory model. 
No fault can be found concerning the level of specific statutory premises 
determining the content of regulatory decisions on obligations imposed on SMP 
operators. Article 35(2) PT requires that, while determining the scope of the 
telecoms access obligation, “the President of UKE will take into consideration 
the preliminary investments made by the owner of the equipment or associate 
facilities, having taken into account the investment risk” and “the necessity to 
ensure long term competitiveness”. It reflects all guidelines that can be derived 
from the EC directives on electronic communications as regards long term 
interests connected with the development of new infrastructure. 
However, the wording of the respective provisions in the EC and national 
law does not impose any specific obligations of the national regulator to 
promote investment. The provisions of the TL merely specify the various factors 
influencing regulatory decisions; it is the responsibility of the regulatory body 
to strike the right balance between service- and infrastructure competition 
while determining access obligations and setting prices5. 
The vague impact of the rules concerning investment on regulatory practice, 
both in EC and national law, raises an issue of regulatory policies pursued 
at the Community and national level. Various policy concepts concerning the 
promotion of investments in telecoms are being developed. On the basis of 
the provisions of the directives, an attempt is made to transpose its broad and 
vague provisions on investment, new markets and investment risk into policy 
concepts stimulating regulatory decisions. They are reflected in documents 
and reports of the European Commission, the European Regulators Group 
(ERG), organisations and associations of telecoms operators, in national 
regulatory strategies as well as in literature. 
IV. The concepts of regulatory promotion of investments in telecoms
1. The concept of new and emerging markets (regulatory holidays)
The concept of new and emerging markets is promoted mainly by incumbent 
operators and their associations. It is based on recital 27 of the Framework 
Directive forewarning against a premature imposition of regulation upon 
emerging markets. A similar approach appears in the European Commission’s 
5 See: F. Kamiński, “Oddziaływanie regulacji konkurencji na nowe inwestycje oraz strukturę 
rynku komunikacji elektronicznej” (2006) 2–4 Telekomunikacja i Techniki Informacyjne 24.
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guidelines on market analysis6 where, with reference to recital 27 of this Directive, 
it is stated that emerging markets where the market leader is de facto likely to 
have a substantial market share should not be subject to inappropriate ex ante 
regulation. Premature ex ante regulation may unduly influence the competitive 
conditions taking shape on such markets. Incumbents explored this concept trying 
to exclude some new investment projects from access regulation, in particular, 
in relation to the construction of broadband access networks using optical fibre 
technologies. The practical attempts to use this legal basis as a foundation of 
regulatory policy are called “regulatory holidays” or “access holidays”7.
From the start the idea of regulatory holidays stumbled over the vagueness 
of the notion of “new and emerging markets”. In the light of the European 
Commission’s Recommendation on relevant markets8, new and emerging 
markets seem to be perceived as “innovation-driven markets characterized 
by ongoing technological progress”. However, in the initial phase of the 
application of the Framework Directive, the Commission did not clarify 
this notion. This fact was criticised by some incumbents within the review 
of the EC legislation on electronic communications that took place in 2006. 
According to major European incumbents, the vagueness of this notion limits 
its suitability for shaping regulatory policy. At the same time, alternative 
operators claimed that attributing too much attention to the notion of new 
and emerging markets creates more confusion than useful guidance for the 
regulatory process. They asserted that applying this concept is to likely to 
result in re-monopolisation of access markets relying on modernised or newly 
constructed access infrastructure. 
The ERG cast some light on this concept by stating that “there is no 
generally accepted definition of an “emerging market”. But in the view of 
ERG, the distinguishing feature of such a market is that it is immature which 
implies that there is high degree of demand uncertainty and entrants to the 
market bear higher risk. Where these characteristics are present, it will not 
be possible to make definitive findings on whether or not the three criteria 
are met in relation to the emerging market”9. According to the ERG, close 
6 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services, OJ [2002] C 165/03.
7 J. S. Gans, S.P. King, “Access Holidays and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment” 
(2002) 14 Melbourne Business School Working Paper. 
8 Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communication networks and services, OJ [2002] L 114/45. 
9 Revised ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the ECNS 
regulatory framework, Final Version May 2006, p. 20.
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monitoring of the situation is necessary where emerging markets are in some 
way linked to established, traditional markets on which a SMP operator 
controls non-replicable inputs required to enter an emerging market. Even 
a large investment does not necessarily create an emerging market. ERG 
insisted that SMP operators take into consideration the previously established 
access obligations while considering new infrastructure investments. The 
ERG is rather inclined towards a critical assessment of the emerging markets 
concept, as far as regulatory practice is concerned, and formulates mostly 
warnings as far as its practical implementation is concerned. This critical 
approach cumulated in the assessment of the “regulatory holidays” concept, 
which reflects a practical attempt to apply the notion of new and emerging 
markets on the national level of telecoms regulation. 
The difficulty of defining emerging markets and identifying such markets 
in practice is generally recognised in the literature10. The task of making this 
notion more operational was pursued by the European Commission in its 
Recommendation on Relevant Markets of 200711. It reflects the standpoint of 
the Commission which was established following the proposal of the German 
regulator to protect some investments made by Deutsche Telecom. According 
to the Commission, incremental upgrades to existing network infrastructure 
rarely lead to the creation of a new or emerging market. The emergence of new 
retail services may lead to the creation of a new, derived wholesale market to 
the extent that such retail services cannot be provided using existing wholesale 
products. This Recommendation states clearly that new infrastructure and, 
in particular, the most expensive passive infrastructure (ducts, optical fibres) 
does not determine by itself the creation of a new market. It is a service 
product, and not a technology, that creates a new market. Only the evident 
lack of substitutability of a new product, proven from the demand, as well 
as the supply-side perspective, gives grounds to conclude that this product is 
not part of an existing market. The demarcation of new and existing markets 
in most disputed broadband services requires thorough examination of user 
behaviours concerning the extent to which they confirm the substitutability of 
successive broadband services. 
A practical attempt to apply the new market concept was made by the Ger-
man regulator (BNetzA) in its draft decision concerning the wholesale broad-
10 P. Baake, U. Kamecke, Ch. Wey, “A Regulatory Framework for New and Emerging 
Markets” (2005) 60(4) Communications & Strategies 131. 
11 Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2007/879/EC, OJ [2007] L 344/65. 
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band access market. The decision declared that the VDSL bitstream service is 
not part of the bitstream market services. BNetzA considered that the existing 
bitstream service based on hybrid networks (mixed copper/fibre networks) was 
a separate area compared to new bitstream services using fully optical fibre 
network. BNetzA regarded connections on VDSL networks as a previously 
non-existing new product that was priced significantly higher for end-users. The 
proposal to exempt this wholesale market from regulation for a 2 year period 
was contested by the European Commission seeing as these products should 
not differ significantly from other broadband products. The next attempt of the 
German authorities to exempt from regulation broadband markets based on 
optical fibre technologies relied on legislative instrument. The rule concerning 
‘new markets’ contained in the German Telecommunications Law excluded 
from regulation markets for products and services that, taking into consid-
eration their functionality, scope, availability for broader users’ groups (mass 
accessibility), price and quality for a rational user, differ significantly from, 
rather than merely replace, previously existing products and services. The Com-
mission decided to refer the German solution called the “regulatory holiday 
law” to the European Court of Justice claiming that it grants an exemption to 
the German telecoms incumbent from the EC directives on electronic com-
munications12. In a similar case, the Romanian regulator, in a market analysis 
carried out before Romania’s accession to the EU, declared that the wholesale 
broadband access market is an emerging market and did not designate SMP 
operators; as a result, no bitstream access offer is available.
The concept of new and emerging markets didn’t influence the regulatory 
practice to a significant extent. The attempts to use this concept for the purpose 
of exempting large scale investment projects in upgrading access networks 
were questioned at the EC level. In light of the clear position expressed by the 
European Commission in the German case, proposals of national incumbents 
that made large scale investments in fibre networks dependant on the granting 
of “regulatory holidays” for services delivered via such networks were blocked 
at the national level.
The Polish telecoms incumbent, Telekomunikacja Polska (TP), offered to 
make large scale investment in optical fibre access networks on the condition 
that the regulator grants it, in advance, an exemption of access obligations 
regarding the newly developed optical network. The proposal was rejected by 
the President of UKE on the grounds of incompatibility with the EC regulatory 
framework as well as the Polish PT. 
The concept of new and emerging markets remains part of the regulatory 
framework for the sake of argument that market is protected from overregulation 
12 IP/07/595, IP/07/888, MEMO/07/255.
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and impediment of innovations. Past discussion helped to solidify the position 
that markets can be considered to be new and emerging if, because of their lack 
of maturity, they do not pass the three-criteria test. No list of such markets was 
established; only VoIP and IPTV service markets are occasionally mentioned 
in this context. The sole implementation of new technology (eg. optical fibre 
networks) does not create a new or emerging market. Until it is confirmed 
from both, the supply and the demand perspective that services provided over 
new infrastructure are not substitutable to the existing offer, an exemption 
from regulation of new infrastructure is not permitted. This however makes it 
difficult to gain a guarantee of exemption before the investment is made. 
2. Sunset clauses
The regulatory framework applied to the telecommunications sector 
encompasses the goal of effective competition which allows desisting from 
ex ante regulation and relying on general competition law instead. Thus, one 
of the concepts supporting investment in telecoms is related to the fact that 
regulatory obligations are imposed only for a period of time specified in a 
regulatory decision. The clauses providing for the expiration of such obligations 
are known as the “sunset clauses”. Sunset clauses could provide some 
predictability and legal certainty concerning the regulatory environment in 
which investment decisions are being made. They could prove to an incumbent 
that ex ante regulation is, as a rule, a transitory phenomenon; they could 
also stimulate alternative operators to investment by showing that long-term 
business models based on regulatory obligations placed on the incumbents 
may turn out to be risky. It could help avoiding rent-seeking activities by the 
beneficiaries of regulation addressing pure service competition13. 
Sunset clauses have only intermediate legal grounds. According to Article 
16(3) of the Framework Directive, where a national regulatory authority 
concludes that a market is effectively competitive, it shall not impose or 
maintain any regulatory obligations. In cases where such obligations already 
exist, it shall withdraw such obligations giving an appropriate period of notice to 
the affected parties. Accordingly, Article 7(3) of the Access Directive imposes 
an obligation on regulators to periodically undertake a market analysis to 
determine whether it is necessary to maintain, amend or withdraw existing 
regulatory obligations. 
13 Y. Chou, K-Ch. Liu, “Paradoxical impact of asymmetric regulation in Taiwan’s 
telecommunications industry: Restriction and rent seeking” (2006) 30 Telecommunications 
Policy 180.
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Different kinds of sunset clauses are considered. Their basic type is related 
to the attainment of the main regulatory goal of effective competition. Such 
clauses result directly from the law which obliges NRAs to periodically review 
regulated markets. Associating the withdrawal of regulatory obligations with the 
attainment of the general objective of regulation reduces somewhat investment 
uncertainty, retaining at the same time the high level of administrative 
discretion. Sunset clauses based on the success of general regulatory policy, 
rather than on measurable criterions, risk to delay the switch-off of ex 
ante regulation. The fact is recognised that credible commitment to sunset 
regulation is difficult14. 
Sunset clauses could also be related to more explicit and measurable 
indicators such as: the quantity of wholesale sales, the penetration of retail 
services, the number of competitors on specific markets or the passage of 
time. 
This concept underpins a decision taken by Ofcom following the review 
of the wholesale broadband access market announced in May 2008. The 
regulatory decision states the conditions on which regulatory obligations 
are being withdrawn or reduced. Exempted from regulation are markets of 
asymmetric broadband access where consumers have access to at least four 
wholesale broadband providers and where the exchange serves 10,000 or more 
premises. Ofcom requires a 12 month notice period for customers who had 
contracts with BT, so that they can continue to operate while making necessary 
alternative arrangements. Besides exempting specific areas of service delivery 
from ex ante regulatory obligations, Ofcom formulates clear cut conditions of 
withdrawal of such obligations as a result of future reviews. 
The concept of sunset clauses attracted the attention of the ERG 
considering that regulatory authority may actively support investment of 
alternative operators by signalling, through the use of sunset clauses, that 
regulation will be removed15. More detailed examination brought the ERG to 
the conclusion that, at least in the case of broadband markets, it is too early 
to anticipate when sunset clauses can be introduced in practice by national 
regulators without risking to disrupt competition16. 
During the initial phase of drafting of the telecoms regulatory framework 
(the 1999 Review), sunset clauses were broadly advertised by the European 
Commission as the main instrument guaranteeing a transitory character of ex 
14 J. A. Hausmanp, J. G. Sidak, “Did mandatory unbundling achieve its purpose? Empirical 
evidence from five countries” (2005) 1(1) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 244.
15 Broadband market competition report, ERG (05) 23. European Regulatory Group, 
available at: www.erg.eu.int, p. 24.
16 Revised ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the ECNS 
regulatory framework, Final Version May 2006, p. 84. 
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ante regulation17. This concept was never developed in subsequent documents. 
Recent attempts of some national regulators to incorporate sunset clauses in 
regulatory decisions on dynamic and territorially differentiated markets gives 
hope that this concept is not forgotten. 
Polish regulatory practice did not use any kind of sunset clauses seeing 
as it was already difficult to finalise, by the end of 2008, the first round of 
the required market analyses. Even the finding of effective competition on 
some markets (transit in fixed networks, wholesale trunk segments of leased 
lines) did not result in an immediate withdrawal of regulatory obligations but 
rather, required separate administrative actions. In order to exempt service 
areas saturated with competitive infrastructure offerings from regulation, 
the incumbent PT proposed the segmentation of markets depending on the 
existing level of competition. This proposal was however rejected by the Polish 
regulatory authority18. 
3. The ladder of investment
The concept of “the ladder of investment” is the best known theory linking 
regulatory goals with the creation of investment incentives. The concept 
encompasses regulatory stimulation of investments in network assets that are 
less and less easily replicable. It mostly relates to investments made by alternative 
operators effecting indirectly also the modernisation of the networks belonging 
to the incumbent. This concept has no explicit legal grounds in EC directives on 
electronic communications resembling instead policy guidance concerning the 
usage of the set of regulatory instruments provided in the directives for national 
regulators. The ladder of investment finds recognition in the documents of the 
European Commission on electronic communications, in opinions expressed 
and statements made by the ERG; it is also widely analysed in literature. 
This concept was mentioned in the ERG’s statement on remedies in 2003. 
According to the ERG, the promotion of infrastructure-based competition 
makes it necessary for national regulators to set investment incentives in order 
for the dominant undertaking’s infrastructure to be replicated wherever this is 
technically feasible and economically efficient, within a reasonable period of 
time. The “approach, where two or more access products at different levels of 
the network hierarchy are simultaneously available to alternative operators has 
17 A. de Streel, A New Regulatory Paradigm for European Electronic Communications: On the 
Fallacy of the ‘Less Regulation’ Rhetoric, ITS-Europe Regional Conference, Berlin, September 
2004, p. 23.
18 Strategia wsparcia rozwoju inwestycji telekomunikacyjnych w Polsce w latach 2008–2011 
– report by Telekomunikacja Polska, August 2008, p. 18. 
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been called the “ladder of investment”19. The European Commission referred 
to this concept in some of its comments to the notifications made by national 
regulatory bodies concerning market analyses20. The broader theory of the 
ladder of investment was discussed by M. Cave21. 
This concept relies on the assumption that regulation should motivate 
alternative operators to invest in infrastructure in order to take advantage 
of less complex, and therefore cheaper, access products of the incumbent. 
In the initial period of competition-creation, regulatory obligations enabling 
new providers to access wholesale services and to resale them are justified 
by the goal of attracting new service providers to the market, reducing retail 
prices, increasing immediate consumer benefit and the utilisation of existing 
infrastructure. Therefore, the initial phase of service competition requires 
obligations enabling the purchase of wholesale line rental and bitstream 
services in addition to carrier selection and pre-selection. On the basis of 
these products, alternative operators may extend their client base, market 
position and revenue. In the next step they should use the unbundled elements 
of the incumbent’s network, in particular, the local loop or sub-loop. On the 
final rung of the ladder of investment an alternative operator gets its own 
access network where, and when it turns out to be the efficient way to reach 
the subscriber. It is assumed that regulation should motivate alternative 
operators to move up the ladder and deeper into the value chain, adding 
more and more of their own infrastructure elements, which normally requires 
new investments. It is assumed that this should result in the development of 
infrastructure competition as well as in the reduction of regulation. 
In order to achieve a functioning ladder of investment, the regulator should 
send the right signals to alternative operators. Pricing of service elements 
located on the initial rungs of the ladder should stimulate alternative operators 
to move up. Thus, the pricing policy of the regulator should create the right 
signals as to whether to build, or whether to buy successive elements of the 
value chain. The timing of price regulation is therefore of key here. In the 
initial phase of market de-monopolisation, regulatory policy should encourage 
alternative operators to buy service-products of the incumbent. Later, as 
alternative providers establish themselves on the market, the incentives to 
19 ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the new regulatory 
framework, ERG (03) 30 rev1, p.13. 
20 SG-Greffe (2006) D/204559, SG-Greffe (2006) D/202659, SG-Greffe (2006) D/204818. 
21 M. Cave, I. Vogelsang, “How Access Pricing and Entry Interact” (2003) 27 Tele-
communications Policy 717–727; M. Cave, “Encouraging infrastructure competition via the 
ladder of investment” (2006) 30 Telecommunications Policy 30 223–237; M. Cave, Regulation 
and Competition Law in European Telecommunications, June 2006, 24, report prepared for 
Post-och Telestyrelsen.
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buy complex service products should decline and finally vanish. Facility-based 
competition should be progressively promoted. This type of policy may result 
in a duplication of alternative infrastructure. It may as well encourage the 
incumbent to invest in infrastructure exempted from ex ante regulation. 
Defining the replicable and non-replicable parts of the infrastructure 
constitutes a precondition for a practical application of the ladder of investment. 
Regulatory policy may address only the replicable parts. The methods for 
assessing the level of replicability of different assets were presented in the 
literature that shows that replicability is not a simple binary variable and may 
depend upon a range of variables22. The assessment of network replicability 
differs in the context of narrowband and broadband networks, services 
provided for institutional and individual customers as well as in light of other 
technical and economic factors. For the concept to be applied, basic rungs in 
the investment ladder need to be clearly identified as well as the economic and 
operational conditions of moving the business up the ladder and the regulatory 
instruments needed to stimulate such move. 
M. Cave speaks of 6 steps of implementing the ladder of investment: deciding 
which of the products in the value chain are clearly non-replicable; ranking the 
replicable components of the value chain for relevant products by their level of 
replicability; identifying the location of the incumbents and the entrants on the 
ladder; assessing the potential progression over the period of the regulatory 
intervention (app. 2-3 years); choosing the regulatory instruments (mode of 
intervention) and calibrating the strength of the intervention; and finally, 
making credible commitment to this policy23. The success of such policy depends 
on the credibility of regulator’s communications warning market players of the 
changing conditions of access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
In regulatory practice the concept of the ladder of investment performs 
mostly an explanatory, rather than a normative, function. In official documents 
of the European Commission the ladder of investment is used to explain 
the development options of alternative operators. The concept is useful 
to describe the relationship between various access services that require 
differentiated investment engagement of the operators seeking access. This 
kind of approach appears in the 12th and 13th Implementation Reports and 
in documents accompanying the proposals for amendment of the directives 
on electronic communication published in November 2007. The ladder of 
investment is used mostly to show the future road facing the incumbents as 
well as alternative operators. To what extent and how regulation should and 
could motivate alternative operators to follow this road remains a separate 
22 M. Cave, “Encouraging…”, p. 226. 
23 M. Cave, Making the ladder of investment operational, available at: http://www.
ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Publication.2916.html, pp. 22–28.
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question. This aspect of the ladder of investment theory is less developed and 
rarely utilised.
ERG documents concerning various aspects of the regulatory approach to 
new infrastructures show more practical orientation. In the ERG’s opinion 
on regulatory principles of New Generation Access, an attempt is made to 
determine what new rungs of the ladder would have to be considered by 
alternative operators if the incumbent decides to construct an optical fibre 
access network24. The guidance of the ERG is concentrates on the identification 
and the reciprocal relationships between new rungs in the investment ladder, 
that is, rungs required by new networks technology. The migration process 
may be disrupted by the lack of necessary rungs and if the distance between 
successive rungs is too great. It is therefore vital for the ladder of investment 
to be a complete structure from the economical, technical and operational 
point of view. The ERG is determined to identify the competitive options 
related to all necessary rungs and the functional migration to higher rungs 
without disrupting services. The ERG stresses that access products should be 
implemented in a logical manner, starting with the lowest rungs. New products 
must be announced in advance to give alternative operators a chance to adapt 
their investment strategy to the new opportunities. In the light of this proposal, 
it is however less important to create impulses inducing alternative operators 
to climb up the ladder. 
The ERG indicates that the prices of products of the incumbent located on 
consecutive rungs should reflect the scope of investment needed to take the 
advantage of a specific product25. This is difficult to achieve if various pricing 
methodologies are applied at different rungs (eg. cost orientation and retail 
minus). 
The approach of the ERG towards the ladder of investment resembles the 
position of alternative operators who insist on the neutrality of this concept. 
The freedom to enter the market on different levels of value chain and the 
possibility of using various products at the same time are important demands 
of alternative operators. The choice of the appropriate access product should 
therefore rest with alternative operators and not with the regulator or the 
incumbent. On the other hand, the incumbents consider that regulatory policy 
implementing this concept should motivate alternative operators to move up 
the ladder. Incumbents criticise the neutral approach saying that, instead of 
a ladder, NRA create a chessboard which allows moves in various directions 
and pricing arbitrage for alternative operators. 
The ladder of investment has a very limited impact on the regulatory 
practice in Poland considering that access products are only in the initial phase 
24 ERG Opinion on Regulatory Principles of NGA, ERG (07) 16rev2, p. XIII.
25 ERG Common Position Bitstream Access, 2 April 2004, ERG (03) 33rev1, s. 10. 
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of their development. During the first round of market analyses, regulatory 
obligations focused on basic access products such as: wholesale line rental, 
bitstream access, flat rate interconnection etc. The next regulatory goal is to 
create further products and secure safe migration from basic resale services 
to unbundled access line or products based on optical fibre infrastructure. 
The major obstacle to be identified here is the lack of a stable pricing policy 
based on cost calculations verified by a competent auditor. In practice the 
ladder of investment is considered by the President of UKE to be a theoretical 
model able to create developmental opportunities rather than an instrument 
for forced infrastructure investments. 
4. The rate of return and price regulation
Rate of return regulation is based on explicit provisions of the Access Directive. 
Its Article 12(2)(c) calls on the regulator to take account, while imposing 
regulatory obligations, of the initial investment by the facility owner, bearing in 
mind the risks involved in making the investment. Article 13(1) requires that 
while regulating prices “national regulatory authorities shall take into account 
the investment made by the operator and allow him a reasonable rate of return 
on adequate capital employed, taking into account the risks involved”.
The Access Directive does not impose a specific method of price control. 
In general, it is required that prices are based on costs. However, different 
types of costs are allowed to be considered while various methods of cost 
determination are applied by an operator and the regulatory body. In practice 
three methods of regulatory price control are being applied: based on cost 
orientation, based on the “retail minus” approach and based on benchmarking 
against prices of similar services in other countries26. Each of these methods 
produces different regulatory effects – each has different effects in terms of 
regulatory certainty for the incumbent and for alternative operators. 
Cost oriented price setting methods prevent the incumbent from fixing the 
price above the cost level in situations where the creation of an alternative 
infrastructure is not possible or is rather unlikely. Since the main version of 
cost orientation (LRIC) reflects the avoidable costs of providing the service, 
it is by itself not the best instrument to stimulate investments. The regulatory 
body may, to some extent, stimulate the calculation of the cost base by setting 
accounting principles and rules of cost calculation. The main instrument of 
influence in this context is connected to the setting of WACC (Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital). By determining WACC, the regulatory body decides 
26 Revised ERG Common Position, p. 75
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what constitutes a reasonable rate of return on the capital employed in the 
provision of services by the regulated company. Normally WACC is set by the 
regulatory body at one particular level by calculating a single rate of return for 
the whole company. Investments in new generation broadband networks are 
associated with a higher level of risk as compared to the traditional business of 
voice and data transmission. In order to stimulate investments, it is attempted 
to adopt a differentiated WACC that takes into account different levels of risk 
associated with each project. The Independent Regulatory Group (IRG) made 
an assessment of the potential to adopt a differentiated WACC that shows that 
this is in theory reasonable from a regulatory point of view. However, lack of 
information makes it difficult to determine the level of risk associated with 
various assets (projects) relative to the market risk27. IRG presented Oftel’s 
experiences in applying a differentiated WACC in order to reflect various 
levels of systematic risk faced by different parts of BT’s business28. Ofcom 
adopted a separate WACC for BT’s copper access network business and for 
the rest of BT’s business. 
Price determination based on “the retail minus” approach prevents 
incumbents from performing a price squeeze; this method is however not 
suitable to stimulate investment. This is particularly true in Poland where 
the wholesale price is calculated on basis of the alternative operator’s retail 
costs and disregards the incumbent’s level of production costs. Although the 
retail minus approach is a recognised in EC law, it is being questioned by 
Polish courts seeing as it was not properly legalised in the PT. Four years 
of exercise in regulatory accounting and efficient cost calculation, supported 
by examinations of independent auditors, did not produce cost data for the 
determination of wholesale prices that could be used by the President of UKE 
and the incumbent. 
The benchmarking method suits only the initial phase of market de-monop-
olisation when no reliable data on costs is available to the regulatory body. 
Long term stimulation of investment on the part of alternative operators 
would require a dynamic pricing policy starting with relatively “low” prices, 
enabling new entrants to start operation, that would be systematically raised 
in order to abandon the incumbent’s complex service products and to move 
towards unbundled elements of its infrastructure. However, difficult must 
preconditions must be met to apply a dynamic pricing policy. First, the 
regulatory body must have precise knowledge of the replicable parts of the 
infrastructure and of the necessary time frame for replication. Second, the 
regulator should predict the market relationships and meet high requirements 
27 IRG – Regulatory Accounting Principles of Implementation and Best Practice for WACC 
calculation, February 2007, pp. 25–29.
28 Ibidem, p. 30. 
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concerning its own regulatory strategy. Third, the level of wholesale prices 
would have to be determined significantly in advance and with a high degree 
of certainty in terms of its tendency to change. This kind of a dynamic pricing 
policy could most of all influence the investment decisions of alternative 
operators. The incumbent’s investments could benefit mostly from a higher 
level of regulatory certainty and predictability. 
There are only few examples of the application of a dynamic pricing policy 
(Canada, Holland). Referring to the Italian experience, the ERG stated that 
cost oriented prices serve better the investment engagement of alternative 
operators than the retail minus approach. However, there is no broader 
consent in this regard. 
The case of price control is one of the most discussed issues in Polish 
regulatory practice. The proposal to use a differentiated WACC was put 
forward by the incumbent TP29 but considered to be impossible to implement 
in a report published by the regulatory authority30. Price regulation during 
the transitory period, moving away from the regulatory framework of 1998 
to the regulatory mechanism based on the 2002 directives on electronic 
communications, was based mostly on benchmarks and on the retail minus 
approach in case of wholesale services related directly to retail services of the 
incumbent. Benchmarking effectively ended with the completion of the first 
cycle of 18 markets analyses and the retail minus approach was successfully 
challenged in courts. The only way forward seems to be the recognition by 
the regulatory body of cost calculations positively verified by an independent 
auditor. So far the positive opinions expressed by the auditor concerning 
cost levels calculated by the incumbent TP were called into question by the 
President of UKE who claimed that the cost levels submitted by TP may lead 
to burdening alternative operators with its inefficiencies.
5. Regulatory approach to Next Generation Networks
The roll-out of NGN and, in particular, of the access part of such networks 
(Next Generation Access) requires substantial investment and therefore 
needs an appropriate regulatory response. The recent recommendations 
and positions of the European Commission31, the ERG32 and the President 
29 Strategia wsparcia rozwoju inwestycji…, p. 16. 
30 A. Piotrowski, Opinia o dokumencie pt. „Strategia wsparcia rozwoju inwestycji 
telekomunikacyjnych w Polsce w latach 2008–2011”, p. 25, available at: www.uke.gov.pl. 
31 Draft Commission Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access 
Networks (NGA), 2008.
32 ERG Common Position on Regulatory Principles of NGA, ERG (07) 16 Rev 2. 
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of UKE33 introduce some new elements to the current set of regulatory 
instruments. The main features of the new approach include: clear focus 
on facility based competition, reorientation towards passive elements of the 
infrastructure, dependence of regulation on network architecture, and a more 
symmetrical approach concerning access to newly built passive elements of 
the infrastructure. 
The prospect of NGN/NGA deployment changes the regulatory perspective. 
New access networks have not been directly linked to the concept of new 
markets. It is expected however that they will be capable of delivering broadband 
services with bandwidths much above the present level. It is recognised that 
clear indications of a break in the chain of substitution, as compared to current 
products, prove the existence of a newly emerging market. 
The fact is acknowledged that the facilitation of infrastructure competition 
should constitute the preferred regulatory option bearing in mind the necessity 
to protect the existing level of service competition. New prioritisation of 
remedies should reflect this approach. Regulatory obligations supporting 
investment should be applied to the lowest level of network architecture. Most 
relevant are regulatory obligations concerning access to passive infrastructure 
elements, in particular, to telecommunication ducts. The new approach entails 
access to existing as well as to new ducts. The same goes for access to civil 
engineering works and other passive infrastructure elements (dark optical 
fibre, street cabinets). 
The regulation of SMP operators’ and alternative operators’ investment 
activity gains slightly in symmetry. The present regulatory framework is, in 
principle, restricted to regulatory authorities encouraging the sharing of 
passive infrastructure. Currently, the imposition on non-SMP operators of an 
obligation to share ducts, and other infrastructure elements, is only permissible 
when other operators are deprived of viable alternatives because of the need 
to protect the environment, public health or security, or to meet town and 
country planning objectives. Now the sharing of infrastructure necessary for 
NGN/NGA should constitute the main regulatory goal. The encouragement 
of infrastructure sharing between SMP and alternative operators should be 
complemented by build-and-share projects. The sharing of infrastructure 
within a building (in-building wiring) may be mandated. The regulatory 
body could even allow SMP operators to refuse access to new investments 
for alternative operators who, without due reason, refuse to grant reciprocal 
sharing of their own passive assets. If there are no existing ducts, access to civil 
engineering works (trenching and ducting) or other passive elements (dark 
fibre) should be mandated which would enable entry for operators willing to 
33 Opinia regulatora dotycząca procesu budowania i eksploatacji infrastruktury NGA 
w Polsce, 17 December 2008.
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invest. It is recommended here that sufficient space for other operators should 
be guaranteed in newly built ducts not only by SMP operators. 
The various speeds of NGN/NGA roll-out in urbanised and rural areas 
justifies the definition of geographic markets at sub-national level – taking 
into account that specific competitive conditions may lead to the withdrawal 
of regulatory control in some areas with developed infrastructure competition. 
Substantial cost differences in the creation of infrastructure in various areas 
should at least justify the abandonment of the geographic averaging of 
wholesale prices. 
The selection of regulatory instruments must recognise the architecture of 
the NGA. Regulation must take into account how close is the optical fibre 
brought to the termination point of the network – to the home of the end-
user (FTTH), to the building (FTTB), to the street cabinet (FTTC) or to the 
network node (FTTN). Decisions in this regard are made by the investing 
operator depending on his investment and business scenario. It is recognised 
here that the competitive result may vary depending on the form of future 
network architecture. Therefore, a different set of regulatory instruments is 
recommended for each of its forms in addition to general principles of the 
imposition of remedies in case of NGN/NGA investments. 
The pricing methods applied to new ducts (Greenfield projects) need to 
incorporate a project-specific risk premium to reflect the investment risk 
incurred by the operator. The methods of calculating the rate of return and 
WACC should strike the right balance between investment stimulation and 
the promotion of efficiency and sustainable competition. 
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